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O P I N I O N 
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
Damien Preston seeks habeas relief based on an 
alleged violation of his rights under the Confrontation Clause 
of the United States Constitution. We agree that the use of a 
witness’s prior statements against Preston violated the 
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Confrontation Clause because the witness, Leonard Presley, 
refused to answer any substantive questions on cross-
examination. However, Preston’s Confrontation Clause claim 
is procedurally defaulted.  
 
 Preston argues that ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel (“IATC”), namely, counsel’s failure to raise a 
Confrontation Clause objection at trial, provides cause to 
excuse the procedural default of the underlying Confrontation 
Clause claim. Before his IATC claim, which is itself 
procedurally defaulted, can serve as cause to excuse the 
procedural default of his Confrontation Clause claim, Preston 
must surmount two obstacles. First, he must overcome the 
procedural default of his IATC claim. Second, he must 
demonstrate that trial counsel’s performance was 
constitutionally ineffective under the two-pronged test 
established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
We find that, under Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), the 
procedural default of his IATC claim is excused. However, 
because he cannot show that he was prejudiced by trial 
counsel’s failure to raise a Confrontation Clause objection, 
Preston’s IATC claim fails at the second prong of the 
Strickland analysis. Therefore, we are unable to grant Preston 
habeas relief, and we will affirm the District Court’s order 






                                            
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 




 Damien Preston is currently serving a twenty- to forty-
year sentence for third degree murder for his role in the 2000 
death of Kareem Williams, who was shot in the midst of a 
physical fight with Preston and his brother Leonard Presley.2  
 
A. Leonard’s Trial 
 In 2001, Leonard was arrested for his role in the 
shooting and tried before a jury in Pennsylvania state court. 
At his trial, Leonard took the stand in his own defense. In 
testimony that was consistent with the statement he gave to 
police after he was arrested, Leonard explained that, on the 
day of the shooting, he parked his car on the 1900 block of 
Dennie Street in Philadelphia. Williams and a woman named 
Latoya Butler were sitting in front of a house on the same 
block. Preston and another man named Chris were also 
standing on the block. Leonard approached Williams and 
asked to have a word with him. The two men walked a short 
distance down the street and had a brief conversation about a 
rumor Leonard had heard about Williams. Williams then 
walked away and entered an alley off of Dennie Street, where 
he retrieved a bag and tucked “something shiny” into the 
waistband of his pants. JA773. According to Leonard, the 
                                                                                                  
certified issues under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. Our 
review is plenary where, as here, the District Court did not 
conduct an evidentiary hearing and relied on the state court 
record. Robinson v. Beard, 762 F.3d 316, 323 (3d Cir. 2014).   
2 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2502(c). Preston was also found guilty 
of possessing a criminal instrument in violation of 18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 907(b) and sentenced to an additional three to 
sixty months’ imprisonment for that offense.  
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shiny object “looked like” a gun. Id. Williams told Butler that 
he would “be back,” continued down Dennie Street, and 
turned the corner onto Wayne Avenue. Leonard followed 
Williams around the corner onto Wayne Avenue, and the two 
men began fighting.  
 
At one point during the fight, Williams had his back 
against the hood of a car parked along Wayne Avenue, with 
Leonard facing him. According to Leonard, Preston then 
came up behind him and began swinging at Williams over 
Leonard’s shoulder.  Leonard heard a gunshot, turned around, 
and saw Preston running away. Leonard ran away as well, 
passing Butler on the corner of Dennie Street and Wayne 
Avenue. Leonard did not see who fired the shot, but he 
testified that it came from somewhere behind him. Leonard, 
Preston, and Williams were the only people involved in the 
fight. Leonard testified that he had not shot Williams and that 
Williams could not have shot himself because the shot came 
from behind Leonard, who was facing Williams. Therefore, 
Leonard “guess[ed]” his brother had shot Williams. JA776. 
Leonard was found guilty of third degree murder.  
 
B. Preston’s Trial 
 A year later, Preston was arrested for his role in 
Williams’s death. He was tried before a jury in October 2003 
in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas. Preston was 
represented by counsel at trial.  
 
 
1. The Commonwealth’s Case-in-Chief 
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The Commonwealth’s primary witness at Preston’s 
trial was Latoya Butler. Butler testified that she and Williams 
were sitting on a porch on the 1900 block of Dennie Street on 
the day of the shooting. Leonard pulled up in a car and joined 
Preston and Chris on a nearby porch. Leonard approached 
Williams and asked to speak with him. Leonard and Williams 
walked down the street and spoke briefly. Williams returned 
to Butler’s porch looking “upset” and told her that he would 
“be back.” JA522. As Williams walked away, Leonard told 
him “You better come back with something big because I’m 
playing with them big boys.” JA522. Williams walked down 
Dennie Street and stopped in an alleyway, where he “picked 
up something.” JA522. He continued down Dennie Street and 
turned onto Wayne Avenue. Leonard followed Williams onto 
Wayne Avenue. After a few moments, Preston, followed by 
Butler, walked down Dennie Avenue and turned the corner 
onto Wayne Avenue as well.  
 
Butler testified that when she turned the corner onto 
Wayne Avenue, she saw the three men fighting. Leonard had 
Williams pinned down on the hood of a parked car, and he 
and Preston were hitting Williams. According to Butler, 
Preston backed up “about two steps,” so he was standing to 
the left of Williams. JA524. She testified that “the way 
[Leonard] had [Williams] pinned down, [Williams’s] whole 
left side was open for [Preston] to shoot him.” JA525.  
Preston stretched out his right arm and aimed “something” at 
Williams. JA524. Preston’s hand and whatever was in it were 
covered by a sweatshirt. Butler then heard a “big loud pop” 
and heard Preston ask Williams “You want some more, you 
want some more?” JA525. Williams fell “flat on his face.” 
JA526. Preston and Leonard fled, passing Butler on the 
corner of Dennie Street and Wayne Avenue. As Butler 
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approached Williams, he told her “They got me.” JA526. 
Butler accompanied Williams to the hospital, where she gave 
police a statement that was consistent with her in-court 
testimony and identified Preston and Leonard in a photo 
array.  
 
Butler also testified to the pre-existing animus between 
Williams and the two brothers. According to Butler, Preston 
and Leonard had sold drugs on the 1900 block of Dennie 
Street for several years. About four months before the 
shooting, Williams began selling drugs on the same block. 
Shortly before the shooting, Preston had confronted Williams 
and told him he could no longer sell drugs there because he 
wasn’t “from the block.” JA520. Preston and Williams had 
also had at least one physical altercation in the past.  
 
The jury also heard from the medical examiner, whose 
testimony largely corroborated Butler’s. He testified that 
Williams had been shot in the left buttock area and that the 
trajectory of the bullet was consistent with a shooter standing 
on Williams’s left side. He also testified that Williams’s 
facial injuries indicated that he had fallen flat on his face after 
being shot. Although he could not conclude that Williams had 
been shot at close-range, the medical examiner testified that 
he had been unable to examine Williams’s clothing, which 
may have contained evidence of a close-range shooting. He 
also testified that if the muzzle of the weapon had been 
covered by a sweatshirt, as Butler testified it was, it would 
have filtered out evidence of a close-range shooting.  
 
Law enforcement officers testified to the physical 
evidence recovered from the scene. Officers recovered a 
bullet from the street in front of a parked car on Wayne 
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Avenue. The hood of the parked car was dented, as one would 
expect if a body had been pressed against it. The 
Commonwealth also introduced evidence that Preston fled to 
North Carolina after the shooting and that no gun was 
recovered from Williams’s body. 
 
The Commonwealth then called Leonard as a witness. 
Leonard asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination and refused to testify. Leonard was concerned 
that his testimony would jeopardize the pending appeal of his 
own criminal conviction. He was granted immunity by the 
District Attorney’s office and was therefore compelled to 
testify. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 401, 458 
(1972) (“use and derivative-use immunity is constitutionally 
sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege”).  
Apparently, this did not assuage Leonard’s concerns, and he 
again refused to testify. See JA599 (Leonard replying “No 
comment. No comment.” to the Commonwealth’s questions); 
JA606 (“I’m in a state of appeal. That’s why I said no 
comment, because I’m in the course of my appeal.”). The 
Commonwealth sought to introduce both the statement 
Leonard had given to police after his arrest and his testimony 
from his own criminal trial as admissible hearsay under 
Commonwealth v. Brady, 507 A.2d 66 (Pa. 1986).3 Defense 
counsel said he had “no problem with [Leonard] being 
Bradyized” using his police statement. JA598. However, 
counsel did object to the admission of Leonard’s prior 
                                            
3 In Brady, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court announced that, 
as a matter of state common law, a non-party’s prior 
inconsistent statement may be used as substantive evidence 
when the declarant is a witness at trial and available for cross-
examination. 507 A.2d at 70.   
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testimony. He noted that he did not have a chance to cross-
examine Leonard, but framed his objection along the lines of 
Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 804(b), rather than as a 
Confrontation Clause claim.4 JA598.  
 
The trial court allowed the Commonwealth to use both 
Leonard’s police statement and his prior testimony. The 
prosecutor read aloud portions of the two statements, 
occasionally stopping to ask Leonard if he remembered 
making them. Leonard largely replied “no comment.” In this 
manner, the jury heard Leonard’s version of events, as 
described above. Defense counsel then attempted to cross-
examine Leonard. With three exceptions, Leonard replied “no 
comment” to every question asked by defense counsel.5  
2. The Defense’s Rebuttal 
                                            
4 Trial counsel’s objection focused on Preston’s inability to 
cross-examine Leonard at the time Leonard gave his prior 
testimony, i.e., at Leonard’s trial. See JA598. Pennsylvania 
Rule of Evidence 804(b), provides that testimony given under 
oath is not hearsay if offered against a party who had an 
opportunity and similar motive to develop it by direct-, cross-, 
or redirect-examination at the time the prior testimony was 
given. Trial counsel did not focus on Preston’s inability to 
cross-examine Leonard at Preston’s own trial, which would 
have signaled that counsel was objecting on Confrontation 
Clause grounds. 
5 When asked if he planned on responding “no comment” to 
all of defense counsel’s questions, Leonard replied “Yes, sir.” 
JA624. When asked if Preston was Leonard’s younger 
brother, Leonard answered “Yes.” JA625. And when asked if 
his parents and sister were sitting in the courtroom, Leonard 
answered “Yes.” Id. 
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Preston took the stand in his own defense. His 
testimony was nearly identical to Butler’s and Leonard’s. He 
testified that he, Leonard, Chris, Butler, and Williams were 
all on the 1900 block of Dennie Street on the day of the 
shooting and that Leonard asked to speak with Williams. 
Leonard and Williams walked down the street and had a brief 
conversation. Williams looked upset, and it was clear that 
there was some sort of “problem.” JA682. Williams told 
Butler he would “be back” and walked down Dennie Street 
and around the corner onto Wayne Avenue. Id. Leonard 
yelled something at Williams as he walked away, then he 
followed Williams around the corner. Preston followed 
Leonard, and when he turned the corner he saw the two men 
fighting. Williams was pressed against the hood of a parked 
car, with Leonard facing him. Preston joined the fight and 
began swinging at Williams over Leonard’s shoulder. Then 
he heard a gunshot and ran away, passing Butler on the corner 
of Wayne Avenue and Dennie Street. Contrary to Butler’s 
and Leonard’s versions of events, Preston testified that he had 
not fired the shot and didn’t have “any idea” where the 
gunshot came from. JA673.  
 
The defense called two additional eyewitnesses, 
Kenneth Stanfield and Christopher Malloy. Stanfield testified 
that he saw the three men fighting on the hood of a parked car 
and heard a shot come from the direction of the three men. He 
did not know who fired the shot and he had not seen anyone 
with a gun. He also testified that Latoya Butler didn’t turn the 
corner onto Wayne Avenue until after the shot was fired. 
Contrary to Butler’s testimony, he testified that Preston was 
standing to the right of Williams. However, Stanfield’s 
testimony suffered from several inconsistencies. For example, 
he testified that Leonard drove his car around the corner of 
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Dennie Street and parked it on Wayne Avenue before 
engaging with Williams, whereas all the other eyewitnesses 
testified that Leonard followed Williams on foot. He also 
testified that he learned of Williams’s death the same day as 
the shooting, which was impossible because Williams did not 
die from his wounds until the following day.  
 
Malloy also testified that he saw the three men 
fighting. Although he did not see any of them with a gun, he 
intimated that Williams’s wound had been self-inflicted. See 
JA657 (testifying that neither Preston nor Leonard had a 
weapon and that right before the shot was fired he saw 
Williams “reach in back” to grab something). He also 
testified that he did not see Butler turn the corner onto Wayne 
Avenue until after the shot was fired. Like Stanfield’s 
testimony, Malloy’s testimony was marred by several 
inconsistencies. For example, he testified that the three men 
were fighting on the sidewalk, not on the hood of a parked 
car. This was inconsistent with all the other eyewitness 
testimony as well as the physical evidence recovered from the 
scene. And Malloy’s suggestion that the gunshot wound was 
self-inflicted contradicted the medical examiner’s conclusion 
that Williams had been shot by someone standing to his left.  
 
At the close of the evidence, the jury was instructed to 
consider first, second, and third degree murder.6 The jury was 
                                            
6 See JA720:  
Third-degree murder is any killing 
with malice that is not first- or 
second-degree murder. You may 
find the defendant guilty of third-
degree murder if you are satisfied 
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also instructed on accomplice liability.7 The members of the 
jury were permitted to consider Leonard’s police statement 
                                                                                                  
that the following three elements 
have been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt: First, that 
Kareem Williams is dead; second, 
that the defendant killed him; and, 
third, that the defendant did so 
with malice. . . . For third-degree 
murder, the malice that is needed 
is the intent to cause serious 
bodily injury. . . .[I]f you decide 
that there was an intent to inflict 
serious bodily injury and then as a 
result of that injury death results, 
that is third-degree murder. 
7 See JA723: 
You may find the defendant guilty 
of a crime without finding that he 
personally engaged in the conduct 
required for commission of that 
crime. A defendant is guilty of a 
crime if he is an accomplice of 
another person who commits that 
crime. A defendant does not 
become an accomplice merely by 
being present at the scene. He is 
an accomplice if, with the intent 
of promoting or facilitating 
commission of the crime, he 
encourages the other person to 
commit it or aids or attempts to 
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and prior testimony as substantive evidence, but they were 
told to view that evidence with disfavor because Leonard was 
an accomplice to the crime. The jury found Preston guilty of 
third degree murder, and he was sentenced to twenty to forty 
years’ imprisonment.  
 
C. Preston’s Direct Appeal 
 Preston was appointed new counsel on direct appeal. 
Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 
1925(b), direct appeal counsel filed a statement setting out the 
matters complained of on appeal. In the 1925(b) statement, 
counsel challenged the sufficiency of the evidence against 
Preston and the use of Leonard’s prior testimony. However, 
he framed the use of Leonard’s prior testimony as a violation 
of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence, not the Confrontation 
Clause.8  
                                                                                                  
aid the other person in committing 
it. You may find the defendant 
guilty of a crime on the theory 
that he was an accomplice as long 
as you are satisfied beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the crime 
was committed and that the 
defendant was an accomplice of 
the person who committed it. It 
does not matter whether the 
person you believed committed 
the crime has been convicted of a 
different crime or degree of crime. 
8 See JA192 (“[T]he Court permitted, over defense objection, 




 The Pennsylvania Superior Court found Preston’s 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to be without 
merit. Commonwealth v. Preston, No. 598 EDA 2004, slip op. 
at 5-6 (Pa. Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 2007). As to Leonard’s prior 
testimony, the Superior Court found that that the evidence 
was admissible under a hearsay exception under the 
Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence. Id. at 6-11. See Pa. R. Evid. 
803.1(1) (a prior statement by a declarant-witness that is 
inconsistent with the declarant-witness’s testimony is not 
excluded by the rule against hearsay if it was given under 
oath subject to penalty of perjury). The Superior Court also 
noted that any challenge to the admission of Leonard’s police 
statement had been waived because it had not been properly 
preserved and presented to the trial court. Preston, No. 598 
EDA 2004, slip op. at 7. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
denied allocatur. Commonwealth v. Preston, 945 A.2d 169 
(Pa. Mar. 26, 2008) (table).   
 
                                                                                                  
Presley’s own trial to cross-examine [Leonard]. At that trial, 
the defendant was not a party, nor did he have a 
representative present, who would have cross-examined 
[Leonard].” (emphasis added)). Like trial counsel, direct 
appeal counsel was concerned with admissibility under 
Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 804(b), which provides that 
testimony given under oath is not hearsay if offered against a 
party who had an opportunity and similar motive to develop it 
by direct-, cross-, or redirect-examination at the time the prior 
testimony was given. The Confrontation Clause issue here is 
Preston’s inability to cross-examine Leonard during Preston’s 
trial, not his inability to cross-examine Leonard at the time 
Leonard gave the prior testimony.   
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D. PCRA Review 
 Preston filed a timely pro se petition for relief under 
the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§§ 9541-46., and was appointed counsel. Before the Court of 
Common Pleas, PCRA counsel raised four claims, including a 
claim that the use of Leonard’s prior statements violated 
Preston’s Confrontation Clause rights. However, PCRA 
counsel did not claim that trial counsel had rendered 
ineffective assistance by failing to raise and preserve the 
Confrontation Clause issue at trial. The Court of Common 
Pleas dismissed Preston’s PCRA petition as without merit.  
 
 Preston, still represented by PCRA counsel, filed a 
notice of appeal to the Superior Court. While Preston’s PCRA 
appeal was pending, the Court of Common Pleas issued a 
written opinion finding that Preston’s Confrontation Clause 
rights had been violated, but it did not grant Preston PCRA 
relief or reverse its previous order dismissing Preston’s 
PCRA petition.9 Commonwealth v. Preston, No. CP-51-CR-
                                            
9 Although the Court of Common Pleas concluded that 
Preston’s Confrontation Clause rights had been violated, it 
did not go so far as to conclude that Preston was entitled to 
PCRA relief based on the Confrontation Clause error. “In 
order to establish a right to relief in a [PCRA] proceeding, the 
petitioner must demonstrate not only that an error has 
occurred but also that the error has prejudiced him.” 
Commonwealth v. Knox, 450 A.2d 725, 728 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1982). The Court of Common Pleas left the harmless error 
analysis for the Superior Court to conduct on appeal, if 
necessary. See Preston, No. CP-51-CR-0607901-2002, slip 
op. at 14 n.21 (“Because this Court finds that the admission of 
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0607901-2002, slip op. at 8-14 (Phila. Comm. Pl. Ct. Dec. 30, 
2010). After briefing, the Superior Court affirmed the 
dismissal of Preston’s PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. 
Preston, No. 2171 EDA 2010 (Pa. Super. Ct. Feb. 23, 2012) 
(table). Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allocatur. 
Commonwealth v. Preston, 50 A.3d 692 (Pa. Aug. 22, 2012).  
 
E. Federal Habeas Review 
 Preston filed a timely pro se federal habeas petition in 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. He claimed that the use 
of Leonard’s police statement and prior testimony violated 
Preston’s rights under the Confrontation Clause, that trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to raise and preserve the 
Confrontation Clause claim, that PCRA counsel was 
ineffective for failing to assert trial counsel’s ineffectiveness, 
and that PCRA counsel’s ineffective assistance caused the 
procedural default of Preston’s IATC claim. The petition was 
referred to the Magistrate Judge.  
 
 The Magistrate Judge recommended that Preston’s 
petition be denied and dismissed. He reasoned that Preston 
had not suffered a deprivation of his Confrontation Clause 
rights because the trial judge had not limited the scope of 
defense counsel’s cross-examination and because, through the 
questions he asked Leonard on cross-examination and 
through his closing argument, defense counsel was able to 
                                                                                                  
Mr. Presley’s prior trial testimony was improper under the 
Confrontation Clause, a harmless error analysis must be done. 
. . . [S]hould the Superior Court agree that the admission of 
the prior trial testimony was improper, the harmless error 
analysis can be completed at that juncture.”).  
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“put before the jury the notion that [Leonard] was not 
credible[.]” JA34. The Magistrate Judge considered 
Leonard’s refusal to answer any of defense counsel’s 
questions insignificant because “the constitutional right to 
confront one’s accuser does not guarantee a perfect 
confrontation.” JA34 (citing United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 
554, 560 (1988) and Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 21-
22 (1985) (per curiam)). In the alternative, he concluded that 
any error the trial court had made in admitting Leonard’s 
prior statements was harmless. The District Court approved 
and adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 
Recommendation and dismissed Preston’s petition with 
prejudice.  
 
 Preston timely appealed to this Court. We appointed 
counsel and granted him a Certificate of Appealability on 
several issues:  
 
1. Whether the admission of Leonard’s prior statements 
violated Preston’s rights under the Confrontation 
Clause in light of Leonard’s refusal to answer any 
substantive questions on cross-examination;  
2. Whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance 
by failing to raise that issue; 
3. Whether the failure of PCRA counsel to raise 
Preston’s claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness 
constitutes cause to excuse the default of that claim 
under Martinez, 566 U.S. 1; 
4. Whether Preston’s claims of trial and appellate 
counsel’s ineffectiveness themselves show cause and 
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prejudice to excuse the default of his underlying 
Confrontation Clause claim. 10   
 
II. ANALYSIS 
 The constitutional claim at the heart of Preston’s 
habeas petition is that the use of Leonard’s prior statements 
violated Preston’s Confrontation Clause right to confront 
witnesses against him because Leonard refused to answer any 
substantive questions on cross-examination. “Federal habeas 
courts reviewing convictions from state courts will not 
consider claims that a state court refused to hear based on an 
adequate and independent state procedural ground.” Davila v. 
Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058, 2062 (2017). Preston’s Confrontation 
Clause claim is procedurally defaulted because trial counsel 
failed to raise and preserve the Confrontation Clause issue.  
                                            
10 Preston’s habeas petition also included a claim that direct 
appeal counsel’s untimely filing of the 1925(b) statement 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The District 
Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to 
dismiss the ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel 
because Preston had not been prejudiced by direct appeal 
counsel’s error. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984). Preston was not granted a certificate of appealability 
on this issue. This Court also denied Preston a certificate of 
appealability on his claim of ineffective assistance of PCRA 
counsel to the extent that Preston asserted it as a substantive 
ground for habeas relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i) (“The 
ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during Federal 
or State collateral post-conviction proceedings shall not be a 




See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9544(b) (“an issue is waived if the 
petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, 
at trial, during unitary review, on appeal or in a prior state 
postconviction proceeding”). Nonetheless, a petitioner may 
overcome the prohibition on reviewing procedurally defaulted 
claims if he can show “cause” to excuse his failure to comply 
with state procedure and “actual prejudice resulting from the 
alleged constitutional violation.” Davila, 137 S. Ct. at 2065 
(quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84 (1977)) .11  
 
“[I]n certain circumstances counsel’s ineffectiveness in 
failing properly to preserve the claim for review in state 
court” provides cause to excuse the procedural default of the 
underlying claim. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 
(2000) (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488-89 
(1986)). As Preston concedes, his IATC claim is itself 
procedurally defaulted because PCRA counsel failed to raise 
trial counsel’s ineffectiveness on state collateral review. See 
Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 738 (Pa. 2002) 
(claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness are waived if not 
                                            
11 Alternatively, a petitioner can overcome a procedural 
default by demonstrating that the court’s failure to review the 
defaulted claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of 
justice. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 748 (1991); 
McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 225, 260 (3d Cir. 1999). 
However, this exception is limited to a “severely confined 
category[] [of] cases in which new evidence shows ‘it is more 
likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted 
[the petitioner].’” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 395 
(2013) (internal alteration in original) (quoting Schlup v. 
Delo, 514 U.S. 298, 329 (1995)). Preston has not urged that 
this exception applies here.  
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raised on PCRA review). Preston’s IATC claim cannot 
provide cause to excuse the procedural default of his 
Confrontation Clause claim unless he can overcome the 
procedural default of the IATC claim. See Edwards, 529 U.S. 
at 451-52 (“[A] procedurally defaulted ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel claim can serve as cause to excuse the procedural 
default of another habeas claim only if the habeas petitioner 
can satisfy the ‘cause and prejudice’ standard with respect to 
the ineffective-assistance claim itself.”). Thus, we turn first to 
Preston’s argument that he can overcome the procedural 
default of his IATC claim under Martinez, 566 U.S. 1.  
 
A. Preston can overcome the procedural default of his 
IATC claim under Martinez. 
 Under Martinez, “a procedural default will not bar a 
federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of 
ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral 
proceeding, . . . counsel in that proceeding was ineffective.” 
566 U.S. at 17. 
 
“[W]here state law requires a prisoner to raise claims of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel in a collateral 
proceeding, rather than on direct review, a procedural default 
of those claims will not bar their review by a federal habeas 
court if three conditions are met: (a) the default was caused 
by ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel or the 
absence of counsel (b) in the initial-review collateral 
proceeding (i.e., the first collateral proceeding in which the 
claim could be heard) and (c) the underlying claim of trial 
counsel ineffectiveness is ‘substantial[.]’” Cox v. Horn, 757 
F.3d 113, 124 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Martinez, 566 U.S. at 
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14). All three of the Cox requirements are met in this case.12 
See Torrez-Ortega, 184 F.3d at 1133 (“The only answers that 
the government cites as departing from th[e] pattern [of 
obstinacy] are too elliptical and confusing to demonstrate that 
the defendants were ever presented with an opportunity for 
effective cross-examination.”). 
 
 The procedural default of Preston’s IATC claim was 
caused by PCRA counsel’s failure to raise the IATC claim 
before the state court on collateral review. See Grant, 813 
A.2d at 738 (claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness are 
waived if not raised on PCRA review). In order to satisfy the 
first Cox requirement, Preston must demonstrate that this 
constituted deficient performance under the first prong of the 
Strickland analysis—meaning that counsel’s representation 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.13 See Brown v. Brown, 846 F.3d 
502, 513 (7th Cir. 2017) (“To demonstrate cause under 
                                            
12 To be precise, Martinez applies if state law, “either 
expressly or as a matter of practicality,” bars prisoners from 
raising IATC claims on direct appeal. Cox, 757 F.3d at 124 
n.8 (citing Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413, 415-17 (2013)). 
Pennsylvania state law requires prisoners to raise IATC 
claims on PCRA review, rather than on direct review. Id. 
(citing Grant, 813 A.2d at 738). 
13 Under the first prong of the Strickland analysis, often 
referred to as the “performance” prong, a petitioner must 
show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 
Under the second prong, often referred to as the “prejudice” 
prong, he or she must demonstrate prejudice as a result of 
counsel’s deficient performance. Id. at 692.   
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Martinez-Trevino, the petitioner must show deficient 
performance by counsel on collateral review as required 
under the first prong of the Strickland analysis. Actual 
resulting prejudice can be established with a substantial claim 
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that would otherwise 
have been deemed defaulted.” (citations omitted)); Detrich v. 
Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[N]o showing of 
prejudice from PCR counsel's deficient performance is 
required, over and above a showing that PCR counsel 
defaulted a substantial claim of trial-counsel [ineffectiveness], 
in order to establish cause for the procedural default.” 
(internal quotations marks omitted)).  
 
We find that PCRA counsel’s performance was 
objectively unreasonable. Counsel clearly recognized that the 
admission of Leonard’s prior statements may have violated 
Preston’s Confrontation Clause rights, as he included a 
Confrontation Clause claim in the state collateral review 
petition. However, PCRA counsel failed to include an IATC 
claim or otherwise acknowledge trial counsel’s failure to 
preserve the Confrontation Clause issue. Appellees have not 
provided, nor can we discern, any strategic explanation for 
PCRA counsel’s decision. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 
(noting a presumption that, “under the circumstances, the 
challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy’” 
(quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1995))). 
Thus, the first Cox requirement is satisfied.  
 
 The second Cox requirement is also satisfied here, as 
PCRA counsel failed to raise the IATC claim in the initial-





 The final Cox requirement is met if Preston’s IATC 
claim is “‘substantial,’ meaning ‘the claim has some merit,’ 
analogous to the substantiality requirement for a certificate of 
appealability.” Cox, 757 F.3d at 119 (quoting Martinez 556 
U.S. 1, 14)). Thus, the question, for Martinez purposes, is 
merely whether “reasonable jurists could debate” that 
Preston’s IATC claim has merit, or whether the claim is 
“adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.”  
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (quoting 
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483 (2000)).  In considering 
whether Preston’s IATC claim is substantial, we are guided 
by the two-part Strickland analysis, but we remain mindful 
that the “substantiality” inquiry “does not require full 
consideration of the factual or legal bases adduced in support 
of the claims.” Id. 
 
 Preston’s IATC claim is “adequate to deserve 
encouragement to proceed further.” Id. As explained in 
greater detail below, trial counsel’s performance fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness, satisfying the 
performance prong of Strickland. There was merit to the 
Confrontation Clause objection, and there was no discernible 
strategic reason why trial counsel would refrain from making 
the objection—counsel did, after all, make an objection based 
on the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence. With respect to the 
prejudice prong of Strickland as it might have been 
envisioned in Martinez, the Martinez Court does not address 
it, other than to say at the conclusion of the opinion that the 
court of appeals “did not address the question of prejudice.” 
Id. at 18. It would seem that, in light of the relatively light 
“substantiality” test regarding the merits of the IATC claim, a 
strict prejudice analysis for Martinez purposes would be 
misplaced. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
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addressed this issue and reasoned that if a petitioner “were 
required to show prejudice, in the ordinary Strickland sense,” 
at the Martinez stage, “this would render superfluous the . . . 
Martinez requirement of showing that the underlying 
Strickland claims were ‘substantial’—that is, that they merely 
had ‘some merit.’” 740 F.3d at 1246 (quoting Martinez, 566 
U.S. at 14). In other words, a somewhat relaxed prejudice 
analysis, in the Detrich court’s eyes, was “necessary to 
harmonize” the various Martinez requirements. Id.  
 
It could be that the need for a showing of prejudice at 
the Martinez stage might rise and fall depending upon the 
strength of the IATC claim. Here, where counsel’s 
performance in failing to assert the Confrontation Clause 
claim seems clearly substandard under the first prong of 
Strickland, we need not concern ourselves with the prejudice 
prong of Strickland in order to satisfy Martinez and excuse 
the procedural default of the IATC claim. Were the 
substandard performance not so clear, we might require more 
of a showing of harm before letting the case advance to a full-
blown Strickland analysis. 
 
B. Preston’s IATC claim fails under Strickland.  
Although he can overcome the procedural default of 
his IATC claim under Martinez, Preston’s IATC claim cannot 
provide cause to excuse the procedural default of his 
underlying Confrontation Clause claim unless trial counsel’s 
performance was constitutionally ineffective. See Edwards, 
529 U.S. at 451 (“Not just any deficiency in counsel’s 
performance will do, however; the assistance must have been 
so ineffective as to violate the Federal Constitution. In other 
words, ineffective assistance adequate to establish cause for 
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the procedural default of some other constitutional claim is 
itself an independent constitutional claim.” (citation 
omitted)). Thus, Preston must demonstrate that trial counsel 
was constitutionally ineffective for failing to raise a 
Confrontation Clause objection to the admission of Leonard’s 
prior statements at trial under the two-pronged test 
established in Strickland.14  
                                            
14  We acknowledge that the Magistrate Judge did not 
analyze the merits of Preston’s IATC claim under the 
Strickland framework. We also acknowledge that we 
generally “do[] not consider an issue not passed upon below” 
and typically remand for the District Court to consider such 
issues in the first instance. Goldenstein v. Repossessors, Inc., 
815 F.3d 142, 149 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Singleton v. Wulff, 
428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976)). Nonetheless, we find that remand 
is unnecessary in this case because the Magistrate Judge, in 
the Report and Recommendation adopted by the District 
Court, did in fact rule on the very issues on which the merits 
of Preston’s IATC claim turns. He ruled on the merits of the 
underlying Confrontation Clause claim—the key issue under 
the performance prong of Strickland in this case. As part of 
that analysis, the Magistrate Judge also ruled that any error in 
the admission of Leonard’s prior statements was harmless—
the very issue on which the prejudice prong of Strickland 
turns. Because the Magistrate Judges has “passed on” these 
issues, remand in this case would be little more than a 
formality. Thus, we will reach the merits of Preston’s IATC 
claim in the interest of judicial economy, but we note that 
remand may be the appropriate remedy in other cases.  
 
We also note that, in some cases, an evidentiary 
hearing may be necessary to determine whether trial counsel 
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1. Preston satisfies Strickland’s performance prong. 
Under Strickland's performance prong, we ask whether 
counsel’s performance clearly fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 
Preston’s IATC claim centers upon trial counsel’s failure to 
raise a Confrontation Clause objection to the admission of 
Leonard’s prior statements. Because “counsel cannot be 
deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim,” 
Ross v. Dist. Att’y of the Cty. of Allegheny, 672 F.3d 198, 211 
n.9 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 
202 (3d Cir. 2000)), we must consider whether a 
Confrontation Clause objection would have been meritless.  
Over fifty years ago, the Supreme Court held that the 
Confrontation Clause barred the use of a witness’s prior 
statement when the witness refused to answer questions on 
cross-examination. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 
(1965). In Douglas’s trial for assault, the state called as a 
witness a man who had been indicted along with Douglas and 
                                                                                                  
was ineffective. See Martinez, 566 U.S. at 11-12 (noting that 
IATC claims can require “investigative work” and that “the 
prisoner is in no position to develop the evidentiary basis for 
a claim of ineffective assistance, which often turns on 
evidence outside the trial record”). A hearing may be 
particularly useful when a petitioner’s IATC claim turns on 
the performance prong of Strickland. See Detrich, 740 F.3d at 
1246 (“For example, to determine whether an attorney’s 
performance was deficient, it is often necessary to ask the 
attorney to state the strategic or tactical reasons for his or her 
actions.”). Here, where Preston’s IATC claim fails on the 
prejudice prong of Strickland, and the factual record is fully 
developed on that issue, no evidentiary hearing is necessary.  
 27 
 
found guilty in a separate trial. Douglas, 380 U.S. at 416. The 
witness was concerned that his testimony would negatively 
impact his own criminal proceedings. Id. Although the trial 
court ruled that the witness did not have a valid claim of Fifth 
Amendment privilege, the witness refused to answer any 
questions on direct- or cross-examination. Id. The prosecutor 
was permitted to introduce portions of a written confession 
previously signed by the witness, which implicated Douglas 
in the assault. Id. at 416-17.  
 
The Supreme Court held that Douglas had been denied 
the “right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation 
Clause.” Id. at 419. “Although the [prosecutor’s] reading of 
[the witness’s] alleged statement, and [the witness’s] refusals 
to answer, were not technically testimony, . . . [the witness’s] 
reliance upon the privilege created a situation in which the 
jury might improperly infer both that the statement had been 
made and that it was true.” Id. Because these inferences 
“could not be tested by cross-examination[,]” use of the 
witness’s prior statement violated Douglas’s rights under the 
Confrontation Clause. Id.  
 
Since Douglas, at least two Circuit Courts of Appeals 
have also held that the use of a witness’s prior statement 
violates a defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause 
when the witness refuses to answer questions on cross-
examination. See United States v. Fiore, 443 F.2d 112 (2d 
Cir. 1971); United States v. Torrez-Ortega, 184 F.3d 1128 
(10th Cir. 1999). We adopt the reasoning of the Supreme 
Court and our sister Circuit Courts of Appeals and conclude 
that the use of a witness’s prior statement against a criminal 
defendant violates the defendant’s Confrontation Clause 
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rights when the witness refuses to answer any substantive 
questions on cross-examination.15  
“The Confrontation Clause provides two types of 
protections for a criminal defendant: the right physically to 
face those who testify against him, and the right to conduct 
                                            
15 To be sure, Douglas and Torrez-Ortega are different from 
this case in that they involved witnesses who responded by 
asserting the privilege against self-incrimination.  We think, 
however, that this distinction is immaterial for our purposes, 
as the Supreme Court has made it clear that an asserted 
privilege need not be properly invoked in order for a potential 
Confrontation Clause problem to arise. See Douglas, 380 U.S. 
at 420 (“We need not decide whether [the witness] properly 
invoked the privilege[.]”); Torrez-Ortega, 184 F.3d at 1133 
(“Settled Supreme Court authority instructs that the validity 
of a witness’s assertion of privilege does not determine 
whether such witness is subject to cross-examination.” (citing 
Douglas, 380 U.S. at 420)).  
 If repeated meritless assertions of privilege can give 
rise to a Confrontation Clause violation, we think repeated 
responses of “no comment” can as well.  In either case, the 
constitutional infirmity is the same: the witness’s out-of-court 
statements are introduced despite it being “evident that he 
w[ill] refuse to give testimony of any sort.”  Fiore, 443 F.2d 
at 115; see also Douglas, 380 U.S. at 420 (“[I]nferences from 
[the] the witness’ refusal to answer added critical weight to 
the prosecution's case in a form not subject to cross-
examination.” (emphasis added) (quoting Namet v. United 
States, 373 U.S. 179, 187 (1963)); Torrez-Ortega, 184 F.3d at 
1133 (“[S]ignificantly, [the witness’s] limited responses were 
elicited well after he had established that he would not answer 
questions on the stand.” (emphasis added)). 
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cross-examination.” Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 
(1987). The constitutionally-guaranteed right to cross-
examination “is a functional right that promotes reliability in 
criminal trials,” Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986), and 
“reflects a judgment” that the reliability of a witness’s 
testimony is best determined by testing in the “crucible of 
cross-examination,” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 
(2004). A criminal defendant’s right to cross-examine the 
witnesses against him applies not only to in-court testimony 
but also to out-of-court statements introduced at trial.16 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-51. Therefore, “a witness whose 
prior statement is to be used must not only be produced but 
must also be sworn and made available for cross-
examination.” United States ex rel. Thomas v. Cuyler, 548 
F.2d 460, 463 (3d Cir. 1977).  
 
A criminal defendant’s right to cross-examination is 
not satisfied simply because a witness appears and takes the 
stand at the defendant’s trial. A criminal defendant is also 
entitled to a “full and fair opportunity to probe and expose 
the[] infirmities” of the witness’s testimony. Fensterer, 474 
U.S. at 22; see also Owens, 484 U.S. at 562 (a defendant must 
have an opportunity for “meaningful” cross-examination); 
Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739 (1987) (the 
Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity to conduct 
                                            
16 The right to cross-examination only applies to out-of-court 
statements that are “testimonial.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.  
Leonard’s police statement and prior testimony are 
testimonial statements. See Id. at 68 (“Whatever else the term 
[‘testimonial’] covers, it applies at a minimum to prior 
testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a 
former trial; and to police interrogations.”).  
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“effective” cross-examination). A full and fair opportunity to 
test the veracity of a witness’s statement through cross-
examination is particularly important when the witness is the 
defendant’s accomplice or co-conspirator. The “truthfinding 
function of the Confrontation Clause is uniquely threatened 
when an accomplice’s confession is sought to be introduced 
against a criminal defendant without the benefit of cross-
examination.” Lee, 476 U.S. at 541. This reflects a “reality of 
the criminal process, namely, that once partners in crime 
recognize that the ‘jig is up,’ they tend to lose any identity of 
interest and immediately become antagonists, rather than 
accomplices.” Id. at 544-45.  
 
We cannot conclude that Preston had a “full and fair 
opportunity to probe and expose” the infirmities of Leonard’s 
statements through “meaningful” and “effective” cross-
examination. Owens, 484 U.S. at 562; Stincer, 482 U.S. at 
739; Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 22. Leonard, concerned that 
answering questions would jeopardize his own criminal 
appeal, responded “no comment” to nearly every question 
defense counsel asked him. See Owens, 484 U.S. at 561-62 
(“Ordinarily a witness is regarded as ‘subject to cross-
examination’ when he is placed on the stand, under oath, and 
responds willingly to questions. . . . [A]ssertions of privilege 
by the witness may undermine the process to such a degree 
that meaningful cross-examination . . . no longer exists.”); 
Cuyler, 548 F.2d at 463 (“A witness who refuses to be sworn 
or to testify at all or one who, having been sworn, declines to 
testify on Fifth Amendment grounds, has not been . . . made 
available for cross-examination” (citing Douglas, 380 U.S. 
415; Fiore, 443 F.2d 112) (internal citations omitted)). 
Without a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine Leonard, 
the admission of Leonard’s prior statements violated 
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Preston’s rights under the Confrontation Clause.17 The lack of 
opportunity to effectively cross-examine a witness is 
particularly problematic where, as here, the witness was the 
defendant’s accomplice. Leonard’s statements, made after the 
“jig was up,” were inherently suspect and should have been 
subject to the crucible of cross-examination.  
 
                                            
17 “[T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees only ‘an 
opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-
examination that is effective in whatever way, and to 
whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Owens, 484 U.S. at 
559 (quoting Stincer, 482 U.S. at 739). For example, if a 
witness’s belief is introduced into evidence, either through 
live testimony or admission of an out-of-court statement, and 
the witness then responds willingly to questions on cross-
examination but is unable to recall the basis for the 
introduced belief, the defendant’s right to cross-examination 
has not been violated. See, e.g., Owens, 484 U.S. at 559; 
Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 20. The defendant in such a case has 
been given a full and fair opportunity to conduct effective 
cross-examination, even if the cross-examination ultimately 
isn’t as effective as the defendant would like due to the 
witness’s forgetfulness. This is because “other means of 
impugning” the witness’s belief remain available: “the 
defendant has the opportunity to bring out such matters as the 
witness’s bias, his lack of care and attentiveness, . . . and even 
(what is often a prime objective of cross-examination) the 
very fact that he has a bad memory.” Owens, 484 U.S. at 559 
(citation omitted). Such is not the case here, where the 
witness categorically refused to participate in cross-




 The Magistrate Judge reasoned, and Appellees argue, 
that Preston’s right to cross-examine Leonard was not 
violated because “there were no legal or court-imposed 
restrictions on the scope or nature of Preston’s questioning of 
Leonard.” Br. for Appellees at 37. Restricting the scope or 
nature of cross-examination violates a defendant’s rights 
under the Confrontation Clause. See, e.g., Delaware v. Van 
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 
(1974). However, this is not the only way in which a 
defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights may be violated. 
“The cases that have arisen under the Confrontation Clause . . 
. fall into two broad, albeit not exclusive, categories: ‘cases 
involving the admission of out-of-court statements and cases 
involving restrictions imposed by law or by the trial court on 
the scope of cross-examination.’” Stincer, 482 U.S. at 737 
(quoting Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 18).  Confrontation Clause 
claims like Preston’s, which fall into the first category, are no 
less valid than those in the second category. Id.  
 
It is of no consequence that Leonard answered “yes” to 
three of defense counsel’s questions; those questions were not 
pertinent to the veracity of Leonard’s prior statements, his 
testimony on direct-examination, or his credibility in general. 
We also reject the notion that Preston’s Confrontation Clause 
right to cross-examination was satisfied because Leonard 
provided limited answers on direct-examination and because 
defense counsel was supposedly able to “exploit” those 
statements in his closing argument. Br. for Appellees at 40, 
43. It is possible that, in some circumstances, a witness’s 
answers on direct examination may provide the jury with 
enough information to reach a credibility determination and 
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therefore satisfy the Confrontation Clause.18 However, neither 
direct examination nor a creative closing argument was a 
substitute for cross-examination in this case.  
 
In short, the admission of Leonard’s prior statements 
violated Preston’s rights under the Confrontation Clause. 
Nonetheless, counsel failed to raise a Confrontation Clause 
objection at trial. Appellees have not provided any strategic 
explanation for trial counsel’s failure to do so. Nor are we 
able to identify one. Thus, trial counsel’s performance was 
ineffective under the first prong of Strickland.  
 
2. Preston fails to satisfy Strickland’s prejudice prong. 
 Next, under Strickland’s prejudice prong, we ask if 
there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The prejudice 
prong of the Strickland analysis is consistent with the general 
“harmless error” standard applicable to all federal habeas 
                                            
18 Consider, for example, a hypothetical witness who 
willingly answers the prosecution’s questions on direct and, 
in doing so, reveals a number of biases against the defendant. 
Assume that the witness then refuses to answer defense 
counsel’s substantive questions on cross-examination. The 
Confrontation Clause rights of the hypothetical defendant in 
such a case may not have been violated because, despite the 
witness’s lack of cooperation on cross-examination, the 
defendant may have been able to “bring out such matters as 
the witness’ bias, [and] his lack of care [or] attentiveness,” 
which is “sufficient” under the Confrontation Clause. Owens, 
484 U.S. at 559.  
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petitioners alleging non-structural errors. See Johnson v. 
Lamas, 850 F.3d 119, 132 (3d Cir. 2017) (“To be entitled to 
habeas relief, a habeas petitioner must establish that the trial 
error ‘had [a] substantial and injurious effect or influence in 
determining the jury’s verdict.’” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993))). 
Given the other evidence introduced at trial, we cannot 
conclude that there is a reasonable probability that the result 
of the proceeding would have been different if Leonard’s 
prior statements had not been admitted. Stated in terms of the 
harmless error standard, we conclude that the admission of 
Leonard’s statements did not have a substantial and injurious 
effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.  
 
First, the content of Leonard’s statements was largely 
cumulative of other evidence. It was nearly identical to 
Butler’s testimony, which also implicated Preston. Preston 
argues that without Leonard’s corroborating testimony, the 
jury would have found Butler’s testimony unreliable. This 
argument is not supported by the record. Butler’s testimony 
was corroborated by the medical examiner’s testimony as 
well as the physical evidence recovered from the scene. It 
also matched the statements Butler gave to police in the 
immediate aftermath of the shooting. Moreover, Preston 
himself largely corroborated Leonard’s and Butler’s version 
of events. Nor does Butler’s testimony contradict that of 
Stanfield or Malloy, both of whom testified that they could 
not see who fired the shot.   
 
Preston places much weight on Stanfield’s and 
Malloy’s testimony, suggesting that Butler did not turn the 
corner, and therefore did not see the shooting, until after the 
shot was fired. However, Preston fails to explain how Butler 
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could have manufactured a version of events that matched 
Leonard’s and Preston’s versions of events, the physical 
evidence, and the medical examiner’s conclusions and 
provided that version of events to police immediately after the 
shooting if she had not seen the events herself. This argument 
also assumes that the jury considered Stanfield and Malloy 
credible witnesses. Yet their testimony was marred by several 
major inconsistencies. For example, Stanfield testified that 
Leonard drove his car down Dennie Street and parked on 
Wayne Avenue before engaging with Williams, while every 
other eyewitness testified that Leonard followed Williams 
down Dennie Street and onto Wayne Avenue on foot. Malloy 
testified that the three men were fighting on the sidewalk, 
while every other eyewitness and the bullet recovered from 
the scene indicated that the fight occurred on the street 
between cars. Malloy’s suggestion that Williams shot himself 
was also contradicted by the medical examiner’s conclusion. 
 
Ultimately, neither Stanfield nor Malloy cast serious 
doubt on Butler’s ability to witness the relevant events either. 
According to Butler, she was at the “corner of Dennie and 
Wayne” when she first saw Leonard and Preston fighting with 
Williams. JA523. Neither Stanfield nor Malloy called that 
into question, and they did not cast doubt on Butler’s ability 
to see the fight from the corner. Instead, Stanfield said that 
he, personally did not see Butler until after the shot, when she 
came around the corner from Dennie Street. Similarly, 
Malloy merely said that he did not notice Butler until she 
came running around the corner. These answers do virtually 
nothing to impeach Butler’s testimony.  
 
Second, aside from their cumulativeness, Leonard’s 
statements were not as damning as Preston suggests. Leonard 
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said he did not see Preston with a gun and could only “guess” 
that Preston was the shooter. JA601. The jury was also 
instructed to view Leonard’s testimony with disfavor, since 
“an accomplice when caught will often try to place the blame 
on someone else [and] may even testify falsely in the hope of 
obtaining a favorable result.” JA723.  
 
Finally, even if, absent Leonard’s testimony, the jury 
would have concluded that Leonard, and not Preston, was the 
shooter, there is not a reasonable probability that the jury 
would have reached a different verdict. The jury was properly 
instructed on accomplice liability and told that Preston could 
be found guilty of third degree murder if he was the 
accomplice of another person who caused the death of 
Williams with an intent to inflict serious bodily injury. Even 
if the jury had concluded that Leonard was the shooter, the 
evidence fully supported a finding that Preston was Leonard’s 
accomplice and was therefore also guilty of third degree 
murder.  
 
Because trial counsel’s failure to object to the 
admission of Leonard’s prior statements does not meet the 
second Strickland prong, Preston cannot use his IATC claim 
to overcome the procedural default of his underlying 
Confrontation Clause claim. Therefore, we are unable to grant 




 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District 
Court’s order dismissing Preston’s habeas petition.   
